Winning a War

 

            Recently, commentators of all stripes have consumed vast amounts of digits and toner describing the various failures of the Presidential war on Iran. And to be sure, when you are dropping bombs, shooting missiles, and sinking ships, you have engaged in a war. The President unilaterally decided to engage in this armed conflict, bypassing the Constitutional requirement for gaining congressional authorization. To be sure, legislators of both parties shirked their duty to enforce the checks and balances laid out in our constitution; but, that is a discussion for another day. The commentators have labeled this conflict a failure for various reasons.

            Depending upon their outlook and political orientation, they blame the President for a lack of goals, shifting goals, the wrong goals, the lack of planning, the failure to develop international support for the operation, underestimating the resilience of the enemy, and the list goes on. Perhaps they are correct. All those things and more doom an operation, military or otherwise, to failure. But I have yet to see anyone articulate the primary reason for failure…boots on the ground.

            Contrary to popular belief, airpower does not win wars. Wars are won when a grubby, goat-smelling, bone-weary soldier raises a flag and says, “This piece of dirt is mine and you cannot come here.”

            Airpower is a combat multiplier. It enhances or eases the job of ground forces. Airpower may bring the troops into combat and keep them supplied. Airpower may keep enemy aircraft off the ground forces. Airpower may interdict an enemy’s ability to supply their own forces; but, airpower does not win wars. Of course many will bring up Hiroshima and Nagasaki as examples of airpower winning the war.

            While dropping the atomic bomb may have hastened the end of the WW II in the Pacific, it was the very real threat of invasion, soldiers stepping on Japanese soil, saying, “This is ours and you do not control it,” that ended the war. The Japanese emperor had seen us inexorably take island by island, marching ever closer to Japan. He knew that not only could we invade and conquer his land we also possessed the willpower to do so. Rather than submit his country to such complete devastation, he capitulated. While airpower certainly paved the way, the threat of ground troops marching over Tokyo ended the war.

            Going into this conflict, the President and his advisors failed to take this basic military truth into account. It doesn’t really matter how many bombs you drop or missiles your fire, until you have troops on the ground to enforce your will, a determined enemy remains undefeated. He underestimated the Iranian government’s ability to absorb destruction; military as well as civilian. Under the thrall of technological superiority, he and his advisors assumed that after the initial barrage of munitions the threat of continued incoming rockets would drive an enemy to their knees, forcing them to seek some sort of negotiated end to the war. They, like so many inexperienced in the realities of modern warfare, underestimated the resiliency of a government and its citizenry.

            While horribly destructive and intensely frightening, areal bombardment rarely drives a citizenry to abandon their government. In Germany and Japan, civilians remained largely behind their governments even under the terrifying strategic bombing campaigns. Londoners remained stalwart and steadfast during the blitz. In more modern times, the destruction of the Twin Towers did not result in an American retreat. Areal attacks while they impede industry, can be overcome by a determined and creative adversary. During WW II the German aircraft industry peaked in 1944 under some of the heaviest strategic bombing of the war years.1 Distributed production and other strategies enabled Germany to continue to increase their numbers of fighter aircraft up until the very end. Japanese manufacturers produced consistent gains up until through 1944 as well.2

            This does not mean that airpower is unimportant; however, planners and advisors must be honest about its capabilities and more importantly its limitations. Depending on airpower alone to bring an enemy to its knees is a strategy destined for failure. We may find video of missiles and bombs streaking toward a target enthralling. We may embrace the idea of winning on the cheap; but, war is never cheap, not in blood or treasure. Airpower, while absolutely paramount, does not ensure victory. To win, at some point grunts have to raise the flag and say, this is mine now, not yours.

1. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/history/aircraft-ww2-de-production.htm

2. https://historydashboard.org/world-war-2-aircraft-production/

Institutional Damage

 

            I served in the Army from 1981 to 2010. I entered as a private, going through basic training at Fort Leonard-Wood, earning my commission as a 2LT in 1988 and eventually retiring after twenty-plus years as a Lieutenant Colonel. During my career, I served at all levels of command, spent two tours in Germany, deployed to combat multiple times, worked with various allied armies, and engaged in operations on four different continents. This is not unusual. Anyone spending over twenty years of active-duty service will have enjoyed a similarly varied career path. I witnessed the deep cold war, the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of communism, the drug wars, and many other tumultuous events of those days. I also participated in the growth and restructuring of the Army.

            When I joined in 1981, the Army was struggling to throw off the chaos of the Vietnam Draftee Army, endemic racism, and the disorderly drug and alcohol drenched years that followed. At all levels with varying degrees of awareness and success, we sought to build an institution which lived up to our oath to protect and defend the constitution from all enemies, foreign and domestic. The changes in the Army were titanic, involving significant upheaval. These changes effected all ranks and all levels of command. As with any major change or restructuring, the changes came with periods of uncertainty and misunderstanding.

            Despite all of this, we built an institution that I was proud to serve in. Of course, it was not perfect. It was built and staffed by humans, so it was imperfect; however, we truly sought to do the right thing while always completing our mission. The Army that emerged from those years was an institution that embraced meritocracy.

            Promotion depended upon a demonstrated ability to operate at the next higher rank. In other words, as a lieutenant I was expected to act like and make the kind of decisions that a captain would make. Performance outweighed race and connections. As an institution, the Army remained apolitical during these years. Now, under the influence of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), Pete Hegseth, much of this hard work is being rapidly undone.

            The SECDEF has fired or put out to pasture many high-ranking officers simply because they do not fit his picture of what a modern warfighter looks like, believes, or endorses. While it has always been true that at the flag-officer ranks, political considerations held great sway; during my years of service, I never witnessed such a wholesale reordering, especially one done on such diaphanous grounds. Some appear to have simply been of the wrong race or gender. Others seem to have been guilty of supporting the previous administration’s stated goals with too much fervor. Whatever the case, this heavy-handed approach has had two deleterious effects.

            First of all, the departure of so many high-level officers deprives the Department of Defense of the wisdom gained through years of experience in combat and peacetime. Given the highly volatile nature of modern warfare and geopolitics, we can ill afford to discard such a large knowledge trust.

            Secondly, these mass firings change the promotion and assignment dynamic from one that is focused on mission accomplishment to one of political conformity. During my time in the Army, I never really cared about, knew, or investigated the political leanings of my fellow soldiers. Of course, I understood their general political leanings. You cannot spend so much time around each other and not know; but, dependability and professionalism mattered most, not political party. Suddenly this changes. Now, devotion to duty and competence take a backseat to political allegiance.

            Thirdly, this politicization of the military damages trust; trust between peers, trust of leaders, and trust of the system in general. Previously, the Army culture laser focused on professionalism and competence built trust in the person on your left or right flank. You knew that they were devoted to personal professionalism and mission accomplishment. Now with this new emphasis on conservative political correctness, one never knows. Now one must wonder if their command will extract some sort of punishment for pulling the wrong lever in the ballot box.

            These factors will exert a corrosive effect on the rank and file of the military. In years past one could generally trust the system to produce competent and motivated Officers and NCOs. Yes, there were exceptions to the rule; however, for the most part, the system produced excellent leaders at all levels. The system included various mechanisms that enabled a service member to seek redress should they encounter rank prejudice based on race or gender. While these levers often brought uncomfortable scrutiny, they ensured the institution as a whole remained one in which professional competence and mission accomplishment were the standard. Those unwilling to embrace those as the standard for evaluation were outliers and once identified swiftly delt with.

            The SECDEF’s efforts to cleanse the military of WOKEness will not result in a higher level of readiness. Instead, he has weakened the military, opening the door for a continuing cycle of political readjustment. The systems designed and refined during the latter years of the twentieth century produced an organization that promoted and assigned based on demonstrated ability to work at the next higher level and approached each day with an intense focus on completing the assigned mission. The Army, while not perfect, fully embraced the lofty goal of “protecting and defending the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic.”